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Preface 
Preludes to the Islamic State: 
Contextualizing the Rise of Extremism in the 
Syrian Uprising 
 
Omar Imady 
 
In this new issue of Syria Studies, two scholars, Stephane 
Valter and Naomi Ramirez, help us understand the background 
against which the Islamic State (IS) emerged as the most 
powerful player fighting against the Syrian regime. 
Undoubtedly, there is far more to this context than these two 
studies share. Nevertheless, the contributions of Valter and 
Ramirez are part of a larger field of scholarship that is not only 
very recent, but that is also attempting to analyse a 
phenomenon that unfolds and changes on an almost daily basis.  
 
In Syrian War Representations, Valter reminds us of the 
inbuilt hostile attitude against the Alawite community that 
Sunni traditionalism never formally disregarded. This attitude 
was not only confined to works of jurisprudence, but it 
regularly manifested itself into anti-Alawite campaigns during 
the Ottoman period. This not only helps us understand the deep 
mistrust held by Alawites towards Syrian Sunnis, but more 
important, it at least partially explains the religious foundation 
which extremist Sunni groups, such as IS, used to legitimise 
their attitudes and actions against Alawites. Granted the 
majority of Sunni scholars in Syria do not identify with these 
sectarian positions, however, few have ventured into directly 
addressing the foundations of these sectarian views in an 
attempt to categorically demonstrate their incompatibility with 
what might be called enlightened Sunnism. Valter also sheds 
light on some of the early sectarian manifestations of the Syrian 
Uprising, which were destined to become the dominant mode 
of expression of both the opposition as well as regime loyalists. 
Valter’s work was completed prior to the events of the last six 
months when IS managed to create a large entity stretching 
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over Iraq and Syria and declare a caliphate. But the narrative 
Valter shares is clearly a prelude to something far more 
dramatic, and in this sense it is a prophecy that has already 
been fulfilled.  
 
In The Strategy and Goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the Syrian Revolution, Ramirez analyzes the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Syrian Uprising. As the largest organised 
opposition group in Syria prior to March 2011, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was expected to play a far more significant role in 
the Uprising, indeed one that involved leadership and 
mobilisation. Though the Brotherhood, as Ramirez shows, was 
quick to get engaged and may have been responsible for the 
initial Facebook page that rallied Syrians to protest against the 
regime, the Brotherhood was unable to articulate its positions 
in a manner that was at once inclusive as well as sensitive to 
the level of brutality which the protestors confronted. The 
narrative of Ramirez points to the fact that the regime 
succeeded in outsmarting the Brotherhood, placing it in an 
impossible position where it had to choose between its popular 
base and the support of secular Sunnis and minorities. The 
Brotherhood’s plight was further complicated by regional 
dynamics involving Saudi/Qatari rivalry. The irony of course is 
that having succeeded in making it very difficult for the 
Brotherhood to survive as a prominent leader of the protesters, 
and later fighters on the ground, the regime now has to deal 
with a far more powerful player which has none of the 
inhibitions that the Muslim Brotherhood once had, the Islamic 
State.  
 
 
 
 
 
